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1. What is the problem?
The convergence in the area of outer space and space 
activities of the European Commission—representing 
the European Union (EU)—and the European Space 
Agency (ESA) has recently culminated in the joint elab-
oration of a European Space Policy.1 Thus, it may seem 
that, by combining the general legislative machinery 
and political clout of the EU with the technical and op-
erational expertise in space matters of ESA, Europe is fi-
nally establishing one single coherent space policy and 
strategy paradigm.
Looking below the surface, however, things may not 
be so straightforward. The European Space Policy, im-
portant as it might be, is still only a step forward in a 
long process. As experience shows, the delineation of re-
spective competences and tasks between the two cen-
ters of “space power” is not always clear-cut. For exam-
ple, in defining priorities for research and development, 
and especially for optional programs,2 the ESA Direc-
tor-General and ESA Council will unavoidably enter the 
area of policy making, which may at first glance seem to 
be the Commission’s domain. Yet the other way around, 
if the Commission were, for instance, to insist on en-
forcing its competition regime3 in the space sector, it 
would substantially and comprehensively interfere with 
the structure of ESA and its space programs, and hence 
with its raison d’être in the first place.
A fundamental flaw remains, as a consequence of the 
fact that the hierarchy of the respective roles of ESA and 
the EU in terms of space activities has not been estab-
lished. In each case where the interests of the two do not 
coincide and thus do not lead to self-evident coopera-
tion, these interests will continue to give rise to institu-
tional tugs-of-war. In short, there are still two captains 
on the European spaceship today.
And indeed, on a number of occasions, the two insti-
tutions seem to be co-operating in a rather circumspect 
and complicated manner, which tastes more like compe-
tition than like co-operation. A case in point is the am-
bitious Galileo project, which may to a large extent de-
termine the strength of Europe’s presence in space for 
the coming decades. In its desire to get Galileo off the 
ground by making maximum use of the EU legisla-
tive machinery, the Commission sometimes seems to 
be oblivious of the strengths and experience ESA has 
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1 Council Resolution on a European Space Strategy, adopted November 16, 2000 (EC and ESA/C-M/CXL VIII/Resolution 1 (Final).
2 Cf. esp. Article V(1.a) and (1.b), Convention for the Establishment of a European Space Agency (hereafter ESA Convention), Paris, done May 30, 
1975, entered into force October 30, 1980; 14 ILM 864 (1975).
3 Cf. esp. Article 81, 82, 86 and 87 (ex-Article 85, 86, 90 and 92), EC Treaty (i.e. Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Rome, 
done March 25, 1957, entered into force January 1, 1958; 298 UNTS 11; as most recently amended by Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty 
on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, done October 2, 1997, entered into force 
May 1, 1999; CONF 4005/97, of September 23, 1997).
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to contribute. From its side, ESA has not always been 
very forthcoming with its own input when it came 
to supporting the various projects developing the fu-
ture contours of Galileo in more detail, paid for by the 
Commission.
These almost inherent struggles will become a real 
problem once they start to interfere with the Galileo 
Joint Undertaking (JU) to be established.4 The JU, as a 
child of ESA and EU charged to lead Galileo through 
the deployment phase into the operational phase due 
by 2008, should not suffer from a lack of competence be-
cause its parents do not fully trust each other, and are 
thus hesitant to delegate any real competence to the JU.
It should be remembered, however, that these intra-
institutional issues are fundamentally the result of inter-
play between sovereign states, through the various con-
stituent treaty members either of the EU or of ESA or of 
both.5 This also means that in the last resort it is up to 
these member states to ensure that the various conflicts 
of interests and competences which have arisen (and 
will probably continue to arise even within the frame-
work of a common European Space Policy) will be mini-
mized or even eliminated.
2. Where to look for solutions?
At a recent workshop on European Space Policy in 
Leuven,6 Mr. Jean-Luc Dehaene, Vice-President of the 
European Convention currently trying to define the fu-
ture institutional “Euro(land)scape,” focused on the op-
tion of including explicit references to outer space and 
space matters in the future Constitutional Treaty, as a 
means of establishing EU competence (whether exclu-
sive, shared or complementary) in that area.
A possible, and perhaps seemingly logical result 
of such an inclusion would be for ESA to become the 
“space agency of the EU,” in roughly the same manner 
as the Western European Union (WEU) is being turned 
into a “defense agency” of the EU. And indeed, it is well 
known that for some years Commission officials have 
more or less officially been contemplating such an ap-
proach in the opinion that it might solve any inconsis-
tencies or internal conflicts in defining future European 
space strategy and policy, and thus make Europe so 
much the stronger in the global space arena.
Tempting as this idea might look, especially from a 
Commission perspective (it requires little imagination to 
understand that at ESA one is considerably less enthu-
siastic, let alone in Norway and Switzerland), this is not 
the solution. The European Union has little experience 
of actually running an operational organization, and the 
Commission seems to lack sheer capacity in terms of 
numbers of staff as well.
ESA undertakes high-technology research and de-
velopment, develops the results into operational space 
systems and—as long as pre-commercial—even oper-
ates these systems; it has built up unique experience 
in doing so over the decades of its existence. Any sub-
ordination of the well-weathered machinery of ESA 
to the preciously small number of Commission offi-
cials who would actually control those activities sim-
ply would not work, and would probably spell the end 
of the European R&D and presence in space as we cur-
rently know it.
These problems are exacerbated by the impending 
enlargement of the EU, which will not only stretch the 
Commission’s capabilities to the extreme, but will also 
result in a number of states having a say, through the 
EU-legislative machinery, over expensive and still non-
routine activities in which they have, so far, nothing at 
stake politically as well as financially.
The European Union and its predecessor(s), the Eu-
ropean Community/ies, were developed to pool to-
gether the legislative resources wherever it was consid-
ered—as an overarching policy imperative—that the 
greater common good of the European members would 
be served thereby. That is where its strength lies, and 
where all its political clout has developed. Sometimes, 
and increasingly so as a result of the ongoing commer-
cialization of space activities, the competences devel-
oped on the basis of this legislative pooling do touch 
upon issues of space, but this is still marginal in view of 
the overall thrust of EU policy and legislation.
By contrast, ESA has been established for purposes 
of pooling, wherever considered beneficial, the finan-
cial resources and know-how of its member states ex-
clusively for space research, development and activ-
ities— apparently these were considered important 
policy imperatives at the time. In view, for example, 
of the (over)enthusiastic financial subscription of ESA 
member states to the optional program Galileo,7 it can 
safely be concluded that these policy imperatives still 
hold true.
4 Council Regulation (EC) No. 876/2002 of May 21, 2002 setting up the Galileo Joint Undertaking; OJ L 138, of May 28, 2002, pp. 1-8.
5 It is often neglected, that whilst currently 13 states are member states of both EU and ESA, ESA members Norway and Switzerland are not mem-
bers of the EU, whereas EU members Luxembourg and Greece are not members of ESA. This issue may actually become exacerbated with the 
future accession to the EU of some ten Middle and Eastern European states, none of which are ESA members as of yet.
6 Second European Space Policy Workshop, “The Stakeholders and their Interests,” organized by the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven and System-
ics Network International on January 10, 2003 in Leuven, Belgium.
7 Originally, ESA’s Galileo optional program, constituting the ESA share complementary to the share of the total budget allocated through the EU 
Council and the relevant EU programs, was oversubscribed by some 33%. At the time of writing, a deadlock still exists between Germany and 
Italy over the industrial leadership of the program as neither wants to diminish its proposed 25% share of the program.
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3. Why this solution?
Thus, it would be appropriate to look for other al-
ternatives, as the underlying problem remains un-
solved. In this respect, the option of the EU becoming 
a member of ESA jumps to the eye as the most effi-
cient and rapidly achievable solution, and should be 
seriously studied as to its further ramifications, possi-
bilities and challenges. Although it may seem a rather 
strange construction to have one international body 
(even if not a classical intergovernmental organization 
anymore, but endowed with a number of quasi-fed-
eral characteristics) becoming member of another as if 
it were a state proper, of course this nevertheless does 
not constitute a complete novelty.
In particular, the case of Eurocontrol, the European 
organization for aviation safety, is relevant, since here 
also the Commission for a considerable time entertained 
the idea to try and integrate Eurocontrol into the EU 
structure, as an operating agency of the Commission. In 
the end, however, the other way round as it were, it was 
the EU which became a member of Eurocontrol. Other 
precedents, or analogous cases, also offer themselves for 
further scrutiny, such as EU membership of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO).
Of course, a number of major legal and institutional 
issues would remain to be dealt with. One of them con-
cerns the voting procedures, especially in the light of 
the co-existence within the EU legal and institutional 
framework of exclusive competences of the EU and 
shared or complementary competences, where the 
member states still have room for autonomously and 
individually injecting their own national policy inter-
ests into the law-making process in the EU. Should 
the EU have 15 votes in the case of a vote on a sub-
ject where exclusive competence applies, or just one? 
Should it have an additional vote in case of shared or 
complimentary competences, or should the Commis-
sion somehow simply internally co-ordinate within the 
applicable EU rules, with the member states still voting 
each on their own account?
Happily, the hallmark of the ESA legal framework 
is flexibility. Thus, while ESA currently counts 15 mem-
ber states, in addition it has a long-standing and almost 
institutionalized co-operation agreement with Canada 
as a “Co-operating State,” whereas it also has the in-
strument of an Associate Membership status readily 
available. There should be little doubt that, especially 
if recourse is being had to the precedents cited, an ap-
propriate legal instrument could be relatively easily and 
rapidly created for optimizing, legally speaking, any ad-
herence of the EU to the ESA Convention.
The flexibility inherent in the ESA framework is also 
pre-eminent in the area of space programs itself. The ex-
istence of ESA does not preclude member states from 
operating their own space programs, if they so desire; 
it rather presents a platform—and as such already a 
stimulus—for looking at possibilities for enhancing ef-
ficiency and the chances of success at a European level. 
Once programs are proposed within the ESA frame-
work, the instrument of optional programs allows for 
an optimum combination of the interests of states on the 
one hand in maintaining their discretion in joining cer-
tain programs—in other words, in implementing their 
national policy priorities—and on the other hand, in 
promoting European co-operation in space.
For these programs, the voting procedure is not the 
essence (votes on adoption of a certain program follow 
the “classical” procedure of “one state, one vote major-
ity voting”); the essence is how much those states desir-
ing to participate in that program wish to contribute. In 
contributing more, a state naturally gains more influ-
ence over the way the program will actually be run.
4. How would it work?
In many ways, EU membership of ESA, to be taken 
care of by the Commission, would result in a logical 
and transparent construction, which could moreover be 
easily and relatively rapidly realized. No difficult pro-
cess of legal and institutional integration into the enor-
mously detailed EU legal and institutional structure, 
taking care of all relevant aspects of the acquis commu-
nautaire, would be needed; a single protocol or other 
special document of accession after a thorough yet well-
confined study of the legal ramifications and special as-
pects should suffice.
In this fashion, any EU policy interest would already 
be given shape through its contribution in the frame-
work of ESA to the discussions and, more to the point, 
to the relevant programs. If the EU’s strong interest in a 
particular proposed project were not taken on board in 
the ESA framework, there would always be the possibil-
ity for the Commission to develop a project outside the 
ESA framework (as it has at some point contemplated in 
the past8), or even to develop a project together with in-
dividual member states.9
8 In 1991, plans were put forward by the Commission to fund “Green Eye in the Sky,” a distinct earth observation satellite for environmental pur-
poses; these plans were toned down by January 1994 to the decision to fund a remote-sensing instrument on board the SPOT-4 satellite.
9 The best-known example of an international European space program outside the ESA framework concerns the SPOT remote-sensing satellite 
system, a French initiative for which the French government managed to interest Sweden and Belgium, and at a later stage also Italy, to the ex-
tent of joining at a minority share level.
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The background to ESA’s industrial policy, as given 
shape in particular through optional programs, also 
offers interesting further options for the EU and the 
Commission to develop policy priorities. The result 
of any investment by an individual member state in 
an optional program is, essentially, that the (private) 
space industry of that state is being offered an excel-
lent opportunity to be awarded relevant ESA con-
tracts under that program through the “fair return” 
principle.10
Transposing this mechanism to a situation where, 
under any of its programs, whatever its focus and legal 
basis (examples such as agriculture, environment and 
transport—Galileo!—come to mind), the EU can invest 
in an optional program, the EU would even be able to 
kill three birds with one stone. By choosing companies 
to fulfill its “entitlement” under “fair return,” it could 
give preference to companies established in a truly EU-
oriented fashion, thus for example breathing new life 
into the concept of a “European Company.” It could, 
in addition, generate more competition for the current 
ESA mode of contracting industry in the context of op-
tional programs.11 Any company from an EU member 
state would in principle be eligible to qualify for the 
EU’s “entitlement,” and might certainly wish to com-
pete for it if it did not succeed in becoming part of the 
“entitlement” of its own state proper (if such state had 
cared to invest in such program in the first place). And 
finally, the EU could further other more general eco-
nomic policy objectives, such as stimulating SMEs or 
start-up companies, precisely by distributing its “enti-
tlement” under the “fair return” principle to some cate-
gories rather than others.
Also, EU membership of ESA would take account 
of the continuing process taking place within the Euro-
pean Union. In the name of the “ever closer union”12 of 
the nations and people involved, areas and issues sub-
ject to shared or complementary competences are then 
brought within the remit of the EU’s exclusive compe-
tences. With both the EU and the member states pres-
ent in ESA, and purportedly both scenarios having been 
allowed for and properly dealt with, such an internal 
EU evolution could be accommodated by ESA in a very 
flexible manner.
In short, the underlying hierarchy issue would be 
solved in a most convenient, transparent and logi-
cal manner. The European Space Agency would be the 
sole captain on the European spaceship, as it has been 
for a number of years to the general benefit of the Euro-
pean space industry and the economies and societies in-
volved. The European Union would, as it were, accede 
to the board of the shipping company, ultimately con-
trolling the captain and his ship. Whether this requires 
a change in EU treaty law, and in particular whether it 
requires inclusion of space in the area of competence of 
the EU under the Constitutional Treaty to be drafted, 
is therefore in a sense a secondary question; but for the 
beneficial progress of Europe’s journey in space, the 
above solution seems the most adequate, certainly in the 
short run.
10 See Article IV, Annex V, ESA Convention.
11 It may be noted that, indeed, the “fair return” principle has drawn repeated criticism from EU circles because of its potential anti-competitive 
effects. So far, the overriding interest also of the EU in a strong and healthy European space industry has precluded the relevant EU bodies from 
taking any action, but the unease remains in principle.
12 Article 1 (ex-Article A), Treaty on European Union, Maastricht, done February 7, 1992, entered into force November 1, 1993; 31 ILM 247 (1992); 
as most recently amended by Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Commu-
nities and Certain Related Acts, done October 2, 1997, entered into force May 1, 1999; CONF 4005/97, of September 23, 1997.
